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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-LIMITATION 
OF THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO CONSENT-In re Scott K., 75 Cal. 
App. 3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 
P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In re Scott K.l concerns the arrest of a seventeen-year-old mi­
nor for possession of marijuana. In 1976, Scott's mother found 
some marijuana in his desk drawer and turned the marijuana over 
to the police. 2 The police notified Scott's father of the impending 
arrest and requested his cooperation. Scott's father consented to 
the police officers' plan to apprehend Scott in the garage. He also 
told the police that they would be welcome inside the family resi­
dence after the arrest. 3 The police, lacking an arrest warrant, pro­
ceeded with this plan. 
Mter the arrest, the police entered Scott's home. They 
searched Scott's bedroom without a search warrant but with his fa­
ther's consent. Scott did not object to the search until the police 
discovered a locked toolbox. Scott possessed the only key to the 
lock. He initially refused to surrender the key; however, he 
changed his mind when the police informed him that they had 
been given permission to break the box open if a key was not 
provided. The search of the toolbox disclosed nine small plastic 
bags containing marijuana. 4 
At Scott's adjudicatory hearing,5 the trial court decided that 
the arrest was illegal because no exigent circumstances existed to 
circumvent the requirement that the police obtain an arrest war­
1. 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cen. denied, 444 U.S. 973 
(1979). 
2. Id. at 398-99, 595 P.2d at 106, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672. 
3. Id. at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673. 
4. Id. 
5. A juvenile adjudicatory hearing differs from a criminal proceeding in that its 
purpose is to correct the transgressions of the youthful offender by benevolently in­
stilling a sense of parental supervision. See In re Schubert, 153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 313 
P.2d 968 (1957). 
The proceeding for declaring a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court is not a 
trial. The minor is relieved of the stigma of criminal conviction through the adminis­
tration of corrective guidance. See In re Steiner, 134 Cal. App. 2d 391, 285 P.2d 972 
(1955). 
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rant prior to making the arrest. 6 Nonetheless, the evidence se­
cured in the seizure of the toolbox was found to be admissible. The 
court concluded that such evidence was not tainted7 as the product 
of an illegal ~rrest. Rather, the search was an act independent of 
the arrest and resulted from both the mother's initial overtures to 
the police and the father's willingness to allow further inquiry into 
the matter.8 The court evaluated the evidence and determined that' 
Scott had violated section 11359 of the California Health and Safety 
Code. 9 Since Scott was a minor, the court, consistent with section 
602 of the Welfare and Institute Code,10 adjudged him a ward of 
the court and placed him on probation. 
Scott appealedll his case to the state appellate court12 on the 
ground that the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. 13 
6. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673; see People v. 
Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 
(1976). "[W]arrantless arrests within the home are per se unreasonable in the ab­
sence of exigent circumstances.... '[E]xigent circumstances' means an emergency 
situation requiring swift action to ... forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or 
destruction of evidence." Id. at 276, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
7. The exclusionary rule of evidence operates to bar the admission of evidence 
which is illegally obtained by the state. As the decision in Scott K. indicates, such 
tainted evidence may result from an illegal search; however, the application of the 
rule is not limited to the fourth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
See also In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970). A minor's oral 
statements made during his custodial interrogation were properly suppressed in a 
proceeding to declare him a ward of the court. The statements concerning his com­
mission of two felonies were made without knowledge of his right to counsel and his 
right to remain silent. Id. at 789-90, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. 
8. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at lO7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673. 
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 
11359 provides: "Every person who possesses for sale any maijuana, except as other­
wise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison." 
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 602 pro­
vides: 
Any person who is under the age of eighteen years when he violates 
any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or 
county of this state defining crime ... other than an ordinance establishing a 
curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, 
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court. 
Id. 
11. Appellant is entitled to review of errors in the adjudication proceeding on 
appeal from the judgment. See In re William C., 70 Cal. App. 3d 570, 577, 138 Cal. 
Rptr. 843, 849 (1977). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); note 47 infra. 
12. In re Scott K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977), rev'd, 24 Cal. 
3d at 395, 595 P.2d at 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 671. The full appellate opinion is 
reported only in the California Reporter. 
13. Id. at 400, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673. When a party seeks to 
exclude tainted evidence from a proceeding, he brings a motion to suppress the 
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The majority opinion affirmed the lower court ruling, stating that 
the solution to juvenile misconduct resides within the family and 
that the courts should not tie the hands of well-intentioned parents 
who seek to correct their child's improper behavior.14 This asser­
tion of parental authority over the minor's claim of fourth amend­
ment protections15 became a focal point of the California Supreme 
Court's determination on the merits. 
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court 
decision,16 holding that fourth amendment protections should be 
extended to minors. The court distinguished between a warrantless 
police search and a private search executed under the guise of pa­
rental authority. 17 Since state action was found to be present in the 
search of the toolbox, the court decided that the minor was enti­
tled to protection against unreasonable police conduct. 18 The ma­
jority of the justices, in granting safeguards against police impropri­
eties, was confident that the effect of the decision would not 
compromise the efforts of parents to maintain a strong family hier­
archy.19 
The state supreme court decision discusses several important 
aspects of the relationship between a minor and the government. 
The court's analysis included inquiries into the extent to which 
evidence in question. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37 
(1970). A policeman tricked a minor into allowing him to enter an apartment. Since 
there was never any consent to the entry, the adjudication of delinquency based 
upon the secured evidence was held to be invalid. Id. Although the minor let the po­
lice enter the premises, his action did not constitute consent since the right to 
consent to a search had not yet been extended to juveniles. See note 114 infra and 
accompanying text. 
In the case of Scott K., the California Supreme Court extended to minors the 
fourth amendment right of excluding tainted evidence from adjudicatory proceed­
ings. 24 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675. See also note 7 
supra. 
14. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63. 
15. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio­
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The California Supreme Court based its decision on protec­
tions springing from the California state constitution. See note 25 infra and accompa­
nying text. 
16. 24 Cal. 3d at 405,595 P.2d at 111, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 677. 
17. Id. at 400 n.2, 595 P.2d at 107 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673 n.2. 
18. Id. at 402,595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75. 
19. Id. at 400-03, 595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75. 
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rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are afforded to 
juveniles, the limitation which the parent-child relationship places 
upon the extension of these rights, and the degree to which par­
ents may waive these rights. The court resolved these issues by 
merging both state law and federal constitutional precedent. 
The United States Supreme Court has extended to minors 
many of the procedural guarantees20 it has afforded to adults; how­
ever, this extension has never included fourth amendment protec­
tions. This results, in part, from the Court's reluctance to decide 
questions affecting the parent-child relationship in the home. 
While the Court has been unwilling to question the right of par­
ents to maintain discipline over their children in the family set­
ting,21 the rights of the parent have given way to the power of the 
government where children have been threatened with exploitation 
in the public sphere. 22 Since fourth amendment questions arise 
more frequently in the privacy of the home, the Court has been 
able to assert this dichotomy as a basis for refusing to entertain 
questions involving family matters arising in the home. 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has nar­
rowed the scope of fourth amendment rights, as they pertain to 
adults, by permitting a broader interpretation of the concept of 
third-party consent. 23 Under this new formulation, it is difficult to 
determine who may validly give consent since the test24 measures 
20. While the United States Supreme Court has not considered the issue of 
fourth amendment rights in the context of the juvenile hearing, other rights have 
been extended to juveniles. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (right to be 
judged by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Tinker v. Des Moines School 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, 
and the right to fair notice of charges). See also notes 35-39 & 47-59 infra and accom­
panying text. 
2l. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (allowing parents to di­
rect the course of their child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(permitting parents the right to raise their children). See also notes 69-77 infra and 
accompanying text. 
22. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding law forbidding 
the sale of pornographic literature to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944) (prohibiting parents from publicly exploiting their children by forcing them to 
engage in religious activities). See also notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (a woman could consent 
to the search of a bedroom that she shared with the defendant). See also notes 24 & 
86-104 infra and accompanying text. 
24. The standard for determining a valid third-party consent is based upon the 
principle of common authority. 
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere prop­
erty interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies 
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the degree of accessibility the consenting party has to the searched 
item. Since the Court has offered no clear resolution to the prob­
lems at issue in Scott K., the California Supreme Court broadened 
the scope of inquiry by considering the precedents of other state 
courts in an effort to interpret the parameters of its own state con­
stitution. 25 
II. DUE PROCESS AND PARENS PATRIAE 
A. Historical Background 
The similarities between the criminal and juvenile justice sys­
tems make it necessary to consider their inherent distinctions. The 
the third party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its at­
tendant historical and legal refinements, see Chapman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord could not validly consent to a search of a house he 
had rented to another), Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (night hotel 
clerk could not validly consent to search of customer's room) but rests rather 
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or 
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the 
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and 
that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit 
the common area to be searched. 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). See also note 92 infra and ac­
companying text. 
25. The California Supreme Court decided the Scott K. case on the basis of ar­
ticle I, § 13 of the state constitution. 24 Cal. 3d at 400, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
at 674. This provision states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; 
and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
and things to be seized. 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. See als(, note 15 supra. 
This distinction is significant since the United States Supreme Court cannot re­
view a state court's interpretation of its own state law as long as that interpretation 
does not restrict a federally created right. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 
(1967) (specifically discussing the fourth amendment issue); Jankovich v. Indiana 
Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965). 
The decision in Scott K. in no way restricted any federal rights. If anything, the 
case broadened the scope of fourth amendment protections afforded to individuals. 
Traditionally, the California Supreme Court has employed this tactic to broaden rights 
in the absence of United States Supreme Court initiative. See generally People v. 
Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973) (search and seizure 
case); Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973) (viola­
tion of due process); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 
P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (claim of equal protection violation). 
Pursuant to an appeal by the State of California, the United States Supreme 
Court tentatively docketed the case of In re Scott K. as No. 79-226. This petition for 
a writ of certiorari was denied on November 26, 1979.444 U.S. 973 (1979). 
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juvenile justice system derived from the English common law,26 a 
body of law which furthered the maintenance of both a strong nu­
clear family and a dominant parental leader.27 The government's 
assumption of an interest in minors corresponded to the develop­
ment of compulsory education programs which tended to introduce 
children into the public sector.28 As a result, the government 
sought to emulate the role of the parent in the public sphere. A 
separate, nonadversarial court system was developed in order to 
satisfy the special needs of children. 29 The government's practice of 
assuming a parental role in the public domain became known as 
parens patriae. 30 
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile justice sys­
tem evolved as a corrective, rather than a punitive, institution. 31 
26. See Fox, Philosophy & the Principles of Punishment in the juvenile Court, 
8 FAM. L.Q. 373, 376 (1974); Geiser, The Rights of Children, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1027, 
1031 (1977). 
27. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the 
State Part II, 4 FAM. L.Q. 410, 413 (1970). Parental power probably cannot be de­
fined except as a residue of all power not lodged elsewhere by the law. Id. See gen­
erally Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, & Protection: The Risks of Child~en's "Rights," 63 
A.B.A.J. 1383 (1977). 
28. See Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 
74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1383-84 n.43, 1388 (1976). 
29. See Garlock, "Wayward" Children and the Law 1820-1900: The Genesis of 
the Status Offense jurisdiction of the juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341, 345-46 
(1979); Comment, The juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909) (general discus­
sion of the evolution of the juvenile justice system). 
"The idea of a juvenile court certainly was not the development of a juvenile 
criminal court. It was to have a healthy specialized clinic, not to conduct criminal 
trials in evasion of the Constitution and Bill of Rights." DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 
U.S. 28, 38 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
30. Parens patriae refers to the broad concept whereby the state assumes pro­
tective jurisdiction over minors. The theory applies in cases of public delinquency as 
well as in cases of parental neglect. See Jensen v. Sevy, 103 Utah 220, 237, 134 P.2d 
1081, 1089 (1943). When viewed in this context, the primary purpose underlying the 
doctrine of parens patriae is the maintenance of the child's safety and well-being. 
See Chandler v. Chandler, 56 Wash. 2d 399, 404, 353 P.2d 417, 420-21 (1960). 
Generally, courts have been hesitant in overruling precedent supporting the no­
tion of the traditional family hierarchy. In most cases, the child's best interests are 
presumed to be synonymous with those of his parents. It is only when parents fail in 
their child rearing obligations that judicial intervention in the areas of delinquency 
and child abuse becomes necessary. Even so, the courts have been reluctant to con­
sider the child's welfare as different from that of his parents. See Geiser, supra note 
26, at 1031-32. See also notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. 
It appears that the decision in Scott K. signals a departure from rigid adherence 
to parental supremacy in the privacy of the home. See also note 75 infra and accom­
panying text. 
31. See Dobson, The juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 397 
(1970). 
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Since the system imposed no real sanctions, there was no apparent 
need for constitutional protections. 32 As enacted, the system at­
tempted to provide for all a child's legal needs: parental protection 
inside the home was coupled with passive governmental attention 
outside the home. 33 It was believed that the adoption of parens 
patriae would obviate the need for procedural safeguards. 
The legitimacy of a system based entirely upon parens patriae 
came into question at the time due process guarantees were being 
extended to adults in criminal matters.34 The first departure from 
strict adherence to parens patriae occurred when a minor was tried 
as an adult and was convicted on the basis of his testimony taken in 
juvenile court. 35 Under this circumstance, it became evident that a 
total denial of rights at the waiver hearing36 could unduly prejudice 
the minor's opportunity to obtain a fair and impartial trial. -The 
question of which rights attached during the waiver hearing was 
32. See Comment, supra note 29, at 109-10. 
33. Id. at 1l0. 
34. The extension of procedural due process rights reached its height during 
the latter years of the Warren Court. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966) (fourteenth amendment provided that states must adhere to fifth amendment 
protections against self-incrimination; therefore, a defendant had to be made aware 
of his right to remain silent); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (fourteenth 
amendment provided that right to counsel included right to meet with retained attor­
ney prior to trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extended rights to 
counsel in noncapital cases to the states, via the fourteenth amendment); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states as protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures). 
35. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 V.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos, a 14-year-old was 
arrested for robbery and assault and was committed to a reform school. When the 
victim of the robbery subsequently died, the boy was charged with murder and tried 
as an adult. He was convicted on the basis of the confession he had made in juvenile 
court. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court stated, "Without some adult 
protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let 
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had." Id. at 54 (majority opinion by 
Douglas, J.). 
36. Waiver hearings are conducted by the juvenile court to determine whether 
the minor should be tried as an adult defendant. Section 606 of the CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE (West 1972) provides: 
When a petition has been filed in a juvenile court, the minor who is the 
subject of the petition shall not thereafter be subject to criminal 
prosecution-based on the facts giving rise to the petition unless the juve­
nile court finds that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with 
under this chapter and orders that criminal proceedings be resumed or insti­
tuted against him. 
For additional discussion concerning the fitness of juveniles to stand trial in 
criminal matters, see generally Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Sub­
stantive View of the Fitness Decision, 23 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 988 (1976). 
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raised in Kent v. United States. 37 In Kent, the United States Su­
preme Court decided that, with regard to waiver proceedings, the 
minor is entitled to "the essentials of due process and fair treat­
ment. "38 While the Court held that such a hearing need not con­
form to all the requirements of a criminal trial,39 the decision did 
cast doubt upon the validity of a system which asserted parens 
patriae as a rationale for excluding all procedural rights. 40 
While the Court still adhered to the basic assumption that 
children and adults should be treated differently under a dual legal 
system, a line of cases emerged tending to obscure this distinc­
tion. 41 The first such case, In re Gault,42 held that during an 
adjudicatory hearing a minor is entitled to the right against self­
incrimination,43 the right to counsel,44 the right to notice of char­
ges,45 and the right to confront witnesses. 46 The Court considered 
the possibility of extending other related procedural rights47 but 
chose instead to confine its holding to the facts as presented. 48 This 
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
38. [d. at 562. 
39. [d. The California courts do not consider subsequent criminal prosecutions 
as a violation of the juvenile's right against double jeopardy. The rationale is that 
since juvenile hearings are not criminal matters, the minor is not subject to criminal 
sanctions twice for the same offense. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 
142-43,262 P.2d 656, 657 (1953). 
40. While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juve­
nile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to 
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical pur­
pose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of consti­
tutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some 
juvenile courts ... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform 
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at 
least with respect to children charged with law violation. 
383 U.S. at 555-56. 
41. See notes 42-58 infra and accompanying text. 
42. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
43. ld. at 55. 
44. ld. at 41. 
45. [d. at 33-34. 
46. ld. at 57. 
47. Gault concerned the arrest and subsequent confinement of a minor who 
had been charged with making obscene phone calls. The Arizona courts failed to 
provide any of the protections mentioned in the text accompanying notes 43-46 su­
pra. In granting a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court discussed 
the minor's right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appellate review; 
however, the Court chose not to reverse on these grounds. [d. at 57-58. 
48. Gault was concerned only with the adjudicatory phase of the hearing. "We 
do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents.' For exam­
ple, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applica­
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self-imposed restriction effectively limited the Court's ability to de­
fine the "totality of the relationship"49 between the minor and his 
government, 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to pro­
vide guidance in the area of procedural rights through a process of 
selective incorporation. 50 In addition to the fifth and sixth amend­
ment guarantees provided in Gault, the Court has extended to mi­
nors first amendment rights,51 as well as the right to be proven 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 52 The Court fashioned a test for 
the extension of due process rights in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania:53 
ble to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention 
to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process." Id. at 13. 
While Gault did not discuss the dispositional phase of the juvenile process, 
there is support for the contention that certain rights should be extended in commit­
ment proceedings when the state is involved. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 
P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977). 
The serious consequences attendant upon involuntary commitment of a 
minor as a mentally ill or disordered person, and the significant potential for 
error in diagnosis convinces us that a minor who is mature enough to partici­
pate intelligently in the decision to independently assert his right to due 
process iIi the commitment decision must be pennitted to do so. 
Id. at 929, 569 P.2d at 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 303. See also Comment, The Mental 
Hospitalization of Children a~d the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186 
(1978). 
49. 387 U.S. at 13. 
50. An analogy can be made between the method implemented by the United 
States Supreme Court in the area of juvenile law and the means employed in the ex­
tension of due process rights to defendants in criminal matters instituted by states. 
See notes 51-58 infra. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). 
The development of due process rights from the federal government to the states 
seemed to be a necessary prelude to eventual extension of those rights from adults to 
children: "If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed [the federal Bill of Rights] ... , 
the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor jus­
tice would exist if [it] ... were sacrificed." ld. at 326. See also In re Scott K., 24 Cal. 
3d at 401 n.4, 595 P.2d at lOB n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674 n.4. See note 20 supra. 
51. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Students were sus: 
pended from school for wearing ann bands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court 
held that a passive demonstration came under the protections of first amendment 
rights to free speech. ld. 
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). A boy committed an act that, if done by 
an adult, would have constituted larceny. Since the offense was of a criminal nature, 
the child's adjudication of guilt had to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. 
ld. 
53. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required). 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that the right to a jury trial in 
an adjudicatory proceeding was not necessary as long as it was compensated by the 
inclusion of some other right: "[T]he states are not bound to provide jury trials on 
demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests 
that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve." ld. at 554. 
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"the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings as 
developed by Gault and Winship is fundamental fairness. "54 
While many of the due process protections have been granted to 
minors, not all these protections can be extended if the system is 
to remain nonadversarial. 55 Thus, for example, the right to trial by 
jury has been denied because of the inherently formalized confron­
tation that such a procedure necessarily entails. 56 The inclusion of 
a jury might frustrate the goals of a system in which benign legal 
counseling must be combined with swift disposition of cases. 57 By 
according to the child most of the privileges and withholding from 
him most of the sanctions, the courts can better inculcate a con­
structive appreciation for the legal process. 58 
B. Analysis 
The first issue the California Supreme Court addressed in In 
re Scott K. 59 was whether the protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures should be extended to minors. 6o Since the 
United States Supreme Court has not considered the fourth 
amendment as it relates to minors, the states are free to decide the 
matter individually.6! Policy considerations support the extension 
of fourth amendment rights to minors. The theory underlying both 
the fourth and fifth amendments is exclusionary in nature. Gener­
ally, the fourth amendment rights take effect prior to the proceed­
54. Id. at 543. For a discussion of the standard of fundamental fairness in a pro­
cedural due process context, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
Is it a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the 
very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such 
a government? If it is, and if it is of a nature that pertains to process of law, 
this court has declared it to be essential to due process of law. 
Id. at 106. See also note 50 supra. 
55. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND­
MENT § 1.5, at 88-89 (1978). 
56. But see In re Carl W., 15 Cal. 3d 271, 285, 539 P.2d 807, 816, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
47, 56 (1975). While the California State Constitution does not require jury trials for 
trials for juveniles, under extraordinary circumstances, advisory juries are permitted. 
Id. See also Comment, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 
811 (1977); 45 TENN. L. REV. 534 (1978) (general discussion concerning jury trials for 
juvenile offenders). 
57. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 89. 
58. Kent v. United States, 386 U.S. at 554. 
59. 24 Cal. 3d at 395, 595 P.2d at 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 671. 
60. Id. at 400, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674. 
61. See note 25 supra. Because the United States Supreme Court has not de­
cided this particular issue, the states have great latitude in broadening, as well as re­
stricting, the application of the fourth amendment as it pertains to juveniles. 
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ing while the fifth amendment rights attach during the hearing. 
Since the decision in Gault extended the fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination during the adjudicatory phase,62 it is con­
sistent to permit the inclusion of similar fourth amendment rights 
where evidence was 'obtained prior to the hearing. 63 The fact that 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions64 have expanded 
the minor's substantive due process rights of privacy provides addi­
tional impetus for suggesting that the corresponding procedural 
rights also should be broadened. 
The California court can base its acceptance of this position on 
both the growing trend of state court holdings favoring extension65 
and the California court's own recent sub silentio holding in the 
case of In re Tony C.66 In Tony C., the court ruled that a minor 
suspected of receiving stolen property and committing rape could 
not legally be detained without reasonable cause. 67 The decision in 
Scott K. follows as a logically consistent corollary to the principle 
implicitly held in Tony C. and enables California to provide minors 
with fourth amendment protections despite the absence of a defini­
tive United States Supreme Court mandate. 68 
III. PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND DUE PROCESS 
A second issue raised in Scott K. concerns the role of the par­
ent with regard to the extension of fourth amendment rights to mi­
nors. Federal case law indicates that certain limitations are placed 
upon the preferred position that parents enjoy over their chil­
dren. 69 While parents reign supreme in their households, the gov­
ernment has a viable interest in protecting minors engaged in pub­
62. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text. 
63. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 59. 
64. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (minors 
have the right to own contraceptives without parental consent); Planned Parenthood 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1976) (minors have the right to terminate their preg­
nancies without parental interference). 
65. See State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 313-17, 230 A.2d 907, 910-12 (Law 
Div. 1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 169-70,267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109-10 (Ulster 
City Fam. Ct. 1966); In re Morris, 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 72,278 N.E.2d 701, 702 (1971); 
In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 228, 295 A.2d 93, 96-97 (1972); Cuilla v. State, 434 
S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See also note 50 supra. 
66. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978). 
67. Id. at 892-94, 582 P.2d at 961-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370-72. 
68. 24 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75. 
69. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
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lic activity. The United States Supreme Court has maintained this 
dichotomy by upholding the rights of parents to bring up their 
children70 and to direct their education.71 Only when children 
were exploited in the public sector did the state rush to their de­
fense. 72 Since these decisions were rendered prior to In re 
Gault,73 they tended to support notions inherent in the concept of 
parens patriae. 
The apparent effect of recent decisions74 that have expanded 
the substantive due process rights of minors has been to reduce 
the scope of parental authority in the home. 75 As a practical mat­
ter, the addition of these rights has lessened the degree to which 
parents can place demands upon their offspring. These develop­
ments troubled Justice Clark, who, in his dissenting opinion in 
Scott K., voiced concern that the decision would seriously impede 
parents' right to maintain discipline over their children: "[a] parent 
who, as in this case, has reasonable grounds to believe that a minor 
child is engaged in serious criminal activity, must be allowed to in­
vestigate that belief. ... [T]he [resulting] search is justified as con­
duct in aid of the parental power of care and discipline. "76 
The majority of the court attempted to dissipate these fears by 
distinguishing a warrantless police search from a private one on the 
basis of whether state action was present. 77 Since the application of 
70. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
71. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
72. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince v. Massa­
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944). These two cases curtail the rights of parents 
over their children when the state has a dominant interest in protecting their 
health and safety. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); note 22 su­
pra and accompanying text. The power of the parent is limited to the extent that "it 
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or 
have a potential for significant social burdens." ld. at 234. 
73. 387 U.S. at 1. 
74. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. 
75. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977); Planned 
I>arenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). Both of these decisions reflect 
normal parental concerns which, until recently, have been decided in the private do­
mestic domain. 
The court in Scott K. failed to consider the question of substantive rights of pri­
vacy. Apparently, the court feared that such an approach would sufficiently restrict 
parents from investigating their child's wrongdoing. See 24 Cal. 3d at 403 n.8, 595 
P.2d at 109 n.8, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675 n.86. See also notes 107-15 infra and accom­
panying text. 
76. 24 Cal. 3d at 406-07, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis­
senting). 
77. ld. at 400 n.2, 595 P.2d at 107 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673 n.2. 
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constitutional protections requires the existence of state action,78 it 
is essential to determine who initiated the search. In the case of 
Scott K., no state action was apparent in the mother's search of the 
desk drawer; therefore, the evidence seized was admissible. 79 The 
search of the toolbox, however, was initiated by the police. Since 
state action was present, any tainted evidence would be excluded 
from the judicial proceeding. 80 When viewed in this light, the de­
cision does not compromise the parents' ability to investigate their 
child's wrongdoing. The extension of the fourth amendment to mi­
nors merely places an additional check upon unwarranted state in­
terference. This only serves to protect the child from the im­
proprieties of the police, not from the well-intentioned aims of 
his parents. 
Justice Clark's dissent implied that parents would be power­
less to deal with complicated social problems if they were pre­
cluded from working in concert with police. 81 The justice con­
doned this cooperative effort by supporting his argument with an 
agency theory: "[w]hat the father could do himself, he could do by 
an agent, whether that agent be a locksmith or a policeman. "82 Ac­
cording to Justice Clark, the action by police was no different than 
the policy which permits school officials to search school lockers 
under a theory of in loco parentis. 83 
Despite the dissent's assertions to the contrary, there are two 
major distinctions between an administrative school search and a 
police search of a private residence. School officials have an identi­
fiable interest in a school locker:84 lacking a warrant, police have 
no such interest in a private home. Additionally, under California 
law, school officials are recognized as private individuals. Since 
78. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Evidence ob­
tained in a private search is admissible even though the search may have been un­
reasonable. This is so because the constitutional safeguards protect individuals 
against state action, and not private action. Id. See also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Under California law, evidence obtained in unreasonable 
searches by state officials is inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Id. 
79. 24 Cal. 3d at 398-99, 595 P.2d at 106-07, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672-73. 
80. Id. at 405, 595 P.2d at 1l0, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675. See notes 7 & 13 supra. 
81. 24 Cal. 3d at 407-08, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis­
senting). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. In loco parentis is a theory by which school officials are delegated pa­
rental powers. See generally Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 31 A.2d 414 (1943). 
84. See In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 510-12, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 
221-22 (1969). 
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state action is not present, their searches are not conducted under 
the scope of constitutional protections. 85 
In Scott K., the extension of fourth amendment rights actually 
imposes a benign effect upon parental power. Parents are not ham­
pered in their ability to investigate wrongdoing since they, like 
school officials, can circumvent due process requirements by pro­
viding police with the evidence they seize. If parents choose not to 
involve the police, they still retain the power to govern their 
child's behavior. While it was not apparent in Scott K., it seems 
that the extension of fourth amendment rights would reduce police 
involvement and would foster the resolution of domestic disputes. 
IV. THIRD-PARTY CONSENT 
The final issue discussed by the court in Scott K. concerns the 
extent to which parents, as third parties, can consent to a search of 
their child's belongings. Consent searches86 have gained favor in 
recent years as the United States Supreme Court has attempted to 
provide police with greater investigatory powers. The current test 
to determine whether authority exists to allow a third party to 
consent to a search was derived from the combined rationales of 
two Supreme Court decisions: Frazier v. CUpp 87 and United States 
v. Matlock. 88 In Frazier, the Court departed from the broad provi­
sions of the exclusionary rule by permitting one party to consent to 
the search of a duffelbag which he shared with defendant. 89 The 
Court upheld the search despite the fact that the consenting party 
possessed only half the items in the bag. The Court, in allowing 
one party to authorize the search, reasoned that defendant had as­
sumed the risk that a third party would consent to a search of the 
jointly shared bag. 90 
In Matlock, the Court fashioned a standard for determining 
when a defendant had assumed this risk. The test evaluated 
whether the third party maintained common authority over the 
85. ld. See also In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 780, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
775, 777 (1973). 
86. Third-party consent searches are those in which third parties give police 
permission to investigate activity to which the defendant had not previously agreed. 
See generally Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 
U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (1973); 41 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1974). 
87. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
88. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
89. 394 U.S. at 740. See also note 7 supra. 
90. 394 U.S. at 740. 
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items to be inspected. 91 Common authority was measured by the 
degree of access or control which the consenting party had with re­
spect to the searched item. Under the Matlock standard, a mere 
property interest was insufficient to permit consent unless it was 
demonstrated that actual control was exerted over the item's use. 92 
California cases decided prior to Matlock were consistent with this 
approach. 93 
The court of appeals failed to apply the Matlock test to the 
facts of Scott K. The facts indicate that Scott objected to the search 
when the police requested the keys to the toolbox. 94 Scott pos­
sessed the only key to the box, and his father readily admitted that 
his son maintained sole control over its contents. 95 There were no 
indications of any mutual use of the toolbox. Furthermore, the 
court of appeals agreed that "if the son had been an adult, the fa­
ther would have had no right to consent to the opening and search­
ing of the locked toolbox."96 Presumably, the father's consent 
would not have satisfied the Matlock test in the absence of the 
parent-child relationship. 
The threshold question in Scott K. is whether parents possess 
rights greater than those announced in Matlock. In his dissenting 
opinion, Justice Clark indicated that parents do enjoy greater 
rights. The justice voiced his support97 of the result reached in 
Vandenberg v. Superior Court,98 a California appellate court deci­
sion which followed a theory of consent premised upon the dispar­
ity of rights between parent and child. 99 In Vandenberg, the appel­
late court permitted a father, who shared a bedroom with his son, 
to consent to a search of their room as well as to a search of his 
91. 415 U.S. at 171. 
92. See note 24 supra. 
93. People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964) 
(apartment guests could not consent to search of property of others jointly residing 
there); People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971) (mother could 
not consent to search of adult son's suitcase); People v. Egan, 250 Cal. App. 2d 433, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1967) (stepfather's consent was invalid in search of adult stepson's 
personal effects found in stepfather's bedroom); People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d 
173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966) (roommate's consent to search residence was not valid 
with regard to the search of an attache case). 
94. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673. 
95. Id. 
96. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 62. 
97. 24 Cal. 3d at 407-08, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678. 
98. 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1970). 
99. Id. at 1055, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 880. 
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son's personal effects.loo Justice Clark incorporated this position in 
his opinion: "a father may grant permission to enter and search a 
bedroom jointly occupied by the father and his son and such 
consent is valid although the son may protest the search. "101 
In the context of the present case, Justice Clark's reliance on 
the decision reached in Vandenberg is misplaced for several rea­
sons. First, Vandenberg was decided prior to the federal ruling in 
Matlock and after a significant number of California decisions 
adhering to a theory of mutual use. 102 Second, the case of People 
v. Daniels,103 decided a year after Vandenberg, invalidated a 
consent search by a mother who allowed police to search her son's 
locked suitcase. 104 The decision in Daniels is significant because it 
asserts the validity of the Matlock principle as a narrowly construed 
guideline under California law. Third, state law prohibits parents 
from waiving their children's constitutional guarantees. lOS If par­
ents are unable to deny the existence of their children's rights, 
then the Vandenberg rationale is necessarily limited in both scope 
and effect. Finally, California law permits children to own property 
independently of their parents. 106 Such law would have no mean­
100. [d. at 1053-55,87 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80. 
101. 24 Cal. 3d at 408, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis­
senting). 
102. See generally note 83 supra and accompanying text; see also People v. 
Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973) (adult son locked himself in his room in 
an effort to resist his mother's consent search, exclusive occupancy was demon­
strated, and the evidence obtained was inadmissible); People v. Flowers, 23 Mich. 
App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970) (minor was being tried as an adult, and the court re­
jected the argument of parental supremacy, finding that the father could not give 
consent when he had no personal involvement in the suspected crime). 
Arguably this theory of parental prerogative is similar to the agency theory the 
United States Supreme Court dispensed with in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 
(1964). In Stoner, the Court denied the right of a hotel clerk to consent to a search of 
a guest's room on a theory of agency. "[Tlhe rights protected by the Fourth Amend­
ment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by 
unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.' " [d. at 488. 
103. 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971). 
104. Id. at 42-45, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 631-33. 
105. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 
(1977) (due process rights of a 14-year-old cannot be waived by parents when child 
is subject to being committed to mental hospital); In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468 
P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970) (parents may not influence minor's right to counsel 
by threatening not to pay the expenses). 
106. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955) ("a mi­
nor child's property is his own and not that of his parents"). See also Estate ofYano, 
188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922). 
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ing if parental rights over the item in dispute were held to be su­
perior to the child's rights.· By granting fourth amendment rights to 
minors, the ruling in Scott K. operates to defeat any theory of 
consent which gives deference to parental standing. 
V. LEGAL PARAMETERS 
The California Supreme Court's holding in Scott K. gives rise 
to several generalizations. First, in order for a child to negate the 
consent of any third party, he must establish an absolute property 
interest in the item in question. In the home setting, it is arguable 
that a particular room may be shared by various family members 
and, therefore, a search of the room is not immune from third­
party consent. 107 Since children may own property found within a 
room, it is likely that such personalized items would not be subject 
to the consent waiver. lOS 
Second, if the child is present and objects to the search of an 
item of mutual use, the decision in Scott K. implies that parental 
consent would not outweigh the child's objections. 109 Cases which 
hold to the contraryllO premise their result upon the disparity of 
rights between parent and child. 111 In view of the decisions ren­
dered in Daniels112 and Scott K., such reasoning is no longer tena­
ble under California law. 
Finally, if the child is absent during the search of an item of 
mutual use, the implication is that the consent would be valid un­
107. This is especially so if the room is shared with a sibling or a parent, as in 
Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Some ju­
risdictions have decided that parental authority reigns supreme even after the deci­
sion in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 164. See State v. Cook, 345 So. 2d 29 
(La. 1977); Nelson v. State, 564 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1977). 
The search of other rooms which serve as common rooms can be consented to by 
parents. See People v. Simmons, 49 Mich. App. 80, 211 N.W.2d 247 (1973) (dining 
room); People v. Bunker, 22 Mich. App. 396, 177 N.W.2d 644 (1970) (basement). Nei­
ther of these two decisions would be affected by the result reached in Matlock. 
108. See People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971) (suit­
case); People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d 173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966) (attache 
case). 
109. 24 Cal. 3d at 404, 595 P.2d at 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 676. 
110. See State v. Clemons, 27 Ariz. App. 193, 552 P.2d 1208 (1976); In Interest 
of Salyer, 44 Ill. App. 3d 854, 358 N.E.2d 1333 (1977); Tate v. State, 32 Md. App. 
613,363 A.2d 622 (1976). 
Ill. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, ~ 11.7, at 733-34. 
112. See notes 93 & 94 supra and accompanying text. 
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der an assumption of risk theory.1l3 If the item is not subject to 
mutual use, then any third-party consent to the search is invalid. 
A related problem which may arise concerns the issue of 
whether the child lacks the capacity to exercise his rights. 
Arguably, the fourth amendment rights extended to children are 
not the same as those extended to adults because some children 
will lack the capacity to appreciate the nature of their rights. Such 
a position is not persuasive. Capacity, like common authority, is an 
issue dependent upon the particular facts of each case. The fact 
that an individual child may lack the capacity to exercise his rights 
should not affect the entire class of minors any more than a senile 
adult's inability to assert his rights should affect other senior citi­
zens whose mental faculties are unimpaired. California law has in­
dicated that a child as young as thirteen years old may consent to a 
search of his parent's home. U4 Certainly, a child who could exer­
cise the right to consent could also exercise the right to deny 
consent. It must be the responsibility of the courts to closely scru­
tinize those situations in which a child has capacity but the par­
ent's waiver of the protected right works to the child's ultimate dis­
advantage. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
- The California Supreme Court's decision in Scott K. broad­
ened the minor's rights vis-a-vis the state without unduly re­
stricting the parent-child relationship. By minimizing unwarranted 
state interference, the decision may well encourage families to re­
solve juvenile problems among themselves. The limitation placed 
upon the parental right to consent to the search of a child's posses­
sions is, in effect, an illusory one since the child's fourth amend­
ment rights may be circumvented if the parent initiates the 
search. u5 
The most Significant aspect of the decision, however, lies in 
the California Supreme Court's willingness to join other state juris­
dictions in extending to minors rights which the United States 
Supreme Court has failed to consider. U6 By granting fourth 
113. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); notes 87-90 supra and ac­
companying text. 
114. In re Robert H., 78 Cal. App. 3d 894, 144 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1978). 
115. See notes 79 & 80 supra and accompanying text. 
116. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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amendment protection to minors while withholding the criminal 
sanctions applicable to adults, the courts will be able to assess real­
istically whether the evolving system of juvenile justice accurately 
satisfies the corrective needs of the child. 
Albert N. Kapin 
